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Abstract
A tobit econometric procedure was used to examine the effect of selected demand and
supply factors on nonreal estate agricultural lending by commercial banks in Texas. Results show
that banks have reduced their agricultural loan portfolios in response to increased use of interest
sensitive deposits after deregulation, Moreover, almost half of this decrease came from banks that
stopped making agricultural loans. Also, results show that banks affiliated with multi-bank holding
companies lend less money to agriculture relative to their assets than do independent banks.
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Commercial banks have traditionally played
an important role in financing agriculture. Their
commitment to agriculture, however, fluctuates. For
example, between 1968 and 1987 their market share
in nonreal estate farm lending in the U.S. ranged
from a high of 66.8 percent (9.7 billion dollars) in
1968, to a low of47.3 percent (32.8 billion dollars)
in 1981, closing at 53, I percent in 1987 (Walraven
and Rosine). The fluctuation in the market share is
a combination of the adjustment in the volume of
funds lent by banks to the agriculture sector and the
adjustment in the number of banks lending to the
agriculture sector. In Texas, the proportion of
banks with zero agricultural loans outstanding
increased from 16,6 percent in 1968 to 35.5 percent
in 1987. Between 1980 and 1987, 9 I commercial
banks, which had been active agricultural lenders in
this period, had zero nonreal estate agricultural
loans outstanding in 1987. Many factors have led
to these fluctuations in agricultural lending.
It is expected that recent deregulation of
commercial banks has affected agricultural lending.
Since the passage of the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
(particularly with the elimination of interest rate
ceilings -- commonly known as regulation Q) banks
have increased their competitiveness in acquiring
loanable funds, mainly in form of time deposits
(Bundt and Schweitzer; Waldrop; Keely and
Zimmerman). However, these time deposits are
associated with higher and more variable costs that
increase the overall risk of the bank operation.
Moreover, changes in the type and characteristics of
a bank’s loanable finds can elicit a realignment of
the bank’s asset portfolio to reflect the new
composition of its liabilities.
The competition for Ioanable funds has an
effect on the cost and availability of loan finds to
agricultural borrowers. Borrowing costs go up as
lenders attempt to transfer some of these higher
costs incurred in acquiring funds to borrowers.
Loan funds to agricultural borrowers may be
curtailed, for example, as banks seek to match their
interest rate sensitive liabilities with interest rate
sensitive, nonloan assets. Banks might increase
security requirements, or decrease the term of the
loan. Banks might also opt to increase the
supervision of the loans to increase performance.
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However, because increased supervision is costly to
the bank, loans may only be extended to those
borrowers with a more than “usual” likelihood of
repayment, thus excluding many potential farm
borrowers.
A tobit econometric procedure was used in
this study to examine the effects of selected demand
and supply factors on agricultural lending. In
particular, the impact that increased commercial
bank reliance on the interest sensitive deposits after
deregulation has on funds that banks allocate to
agriculture relative to other investment opportunities
was examined. Also, independent banks were
compared to multi-bank holding company (MBHC)
affiliates to determine the impact of bank
organization on the share of agricultural loans in
their asset portfolios.
There were 1053 Texas banks included in
this study. Each of these banks was in business
before deregulation (1978) and after deregulation
(1987). In 1978, 7.3 percent and 25.8 percent of
the rural and urban banks were MBHC affiliates,
respectively. By 1987, 24.3 percent and 56.9
percent of the rural and urban banks were MBHC
affiliates, respectively, Thus, it is important to
study the impact this move toward MBHC
organization has on agricultural lending. Although
the data used in this study are unique to Texas,
inferences drawn can be extended to commercial
banks in the U.S,
Model Development
Tobil Procedure
As noted above, several banks have
eliminated agricultural loans from their portfolios,
Therefore, an econometric analysis of an uncensured
sample of banks with agricultural loans as the
dependent variable would have several zero values.
In other words, the dependent variable is part
qualitative (to lend or not to lend) and part
quantitative (the amount lent). The analysis of such
a limited dependent variable is called tobit analysis.
This technique is designed to study models with a
dependent variable having the property that many
observations take on a single value (as in zero
dollars lent for agriculture), with the remaining
observations following the usual characteristic of a
continuous variable (dollars lent to agriculture), It
has received wide application to such problems as
the study of automobile purchases, models of labor
supply, and household purchase of fresh vegetables. 1
In his pioneering work, Tobin analyzed
household expenditure on durable goods as a
fimction of income and other variables. He noted
the distortion in the data resulting from the fact that
many households did not purchase a durable good
during the year of survey, with the possible
explanation that because expenditures on durable
goods are not continuous, purchases are not made
until the “desire” to buy the good exceeds a certain
level. However, desires cannot be observed, only
expenditures, and those will be nonzero only if the
good is purchased. “Negative” expenditures,
corresponding to various levels of desire below the
threshold level, cannot be observed, and all
households with no purchases are recorded as
showing zero expenditure, with no distinction made
between households who were close to buying the
good and those who had very little desire to do so.=
The same is true with commercial banks.
There is a certain threshold beIow which a bank
would not effect an agricultural loan transaction (or
any loan transaction for that matter), although there
would be variations between different borrowers and
lenders reflecting transaction costs, risks, etc.
Lending is not done until the “desire” to lend
exceeds a certain level. Desires, however, cannot
be observed. “Negative loans,” corresponding to
various levels of desire below this threshold level
are recorded as zero agricultural loans, with no
distinction made between commercial banks that are
close to lending to agriculture and those that have
very little desire to do so. Previous research has
circumvented the problem of limited dependent
variables by excluding banks with zero agricultural
loans when investigating factors affecting
agricultural lending. Data samples have been
limited to agricultural banks with existing
agricultural loan portfolios (e.g., Barry and Pepper).
This omission, however, creates sample selection
bias (Heckman, 1979). Rather than delete banks
with zero agricultural loans outstanding from the
sampie, tobit analysis is used to account for this
information and to adequately portray the full range
of commercial bank behavior (Tobin).
To understand this behavior, it is important
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to the agricultural sector involve two types of
adjustments: a) changes in the number of banks
lending to the agricultural sector, and b) changes in
the number and size of agricultural loans made by
commercial banks already lending to agriculture.
The time-series observations on the changes in total
agricultural lending reflect both types of adjustment.
However, it is impossible to estimate the separate
types of adjustment from aggregate time-series data
based on average bank lending to the agricultural
sector (Thraen, et al.). Cross-sectional data, on the
other hand, include observations on individual banks
-. some of which are agricultural Iendcrs, and others
are not. One could estimate the quantity adjustment
coefficients by exclusion of those banks that were
not lenders to agriculture at the time of the survey.
However, it is also possible to estimate both the
lending volume adjustments of commercial banks
already lending to agriculture, and the lending
volume adjustments due to the entry or exit of




be a regression equation for which all basic
assumptions are satisfied. For commercial banks
that made agricultural loans, Yis equal to the actual
agricultural loans made. For those banks that did
not, Y represents an index of the “desire” to make
agricultural loans. The X matrix is a set of factors
thought to affect Y. The ~ is a conformably
defined parameter vector, and E represents the
stochastic disturbance term of the regression.
The value of Y cannot be observed when
loans are not made. Thus, instead of using Y, ~ is




The new equation is
y<i = ‘yp + ~a (3)
where ~ is truncated at zero and & is truncated at
- X ~, This further implies that the lower tail of the
distribution of Y’(and thus of E“) is cut off and the
probabilities are piled up at the cut-off point.
Consequently, the mean of Y“is different from that
of Y, and the mean of EC’ is different from that ofe
which is zero. This is true whether the points for
which Y’equal zero arc included or not included in
the sample. Therefore, limiting the range of the
values of the dependent variable leads to a nonzero
mean of the disturbance and the biasness and
inconsistency of the least squares estimators.
Equation (3) will be estimated using the
tobit procedure. The (3parameters will be estimated
using the maximum likelihood method (assuming
normality of the disturbance term). This procedure
assures the large-sample properties of consistency
and asymptotic normality of the estimated
coefficients so that conventional tests of significance
are applicable.
Following McDonald and Moffit, different
elasticities, evaluated at the means, can be computed
as follows:
x-
q.E[Y”] = - —, (4)
E[Y”]
x-
rlEIY*] = _ —, and (5)
E[Y*]
13F(z) 7
q F(z) = _ —.
ax F(Z)
(6)
where q E[ Y“] is the elasticity of the unconditional
expected value of agricultural lending,,
qE[Y*] IS the elasticity of the conditional
expected value of agricultural lending,
q F(z) is the elasticity of the probability of
making agricultural loans,
F(z) denotes the cumulative standard normal
distribution function, and
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It can be shown that the sum of equations
(5) and (6) is equal to equation (4) (McDonald and
Moffit). In other words, the unconditional elasticity
of making agricultural loans can be broken down
into its component parts: a) the elasticity of making
agricultural loans, for current lenders to agriculture,
and b) the elasticity of the probability of making
agricultural loans. By looking at the two
components, one can find out which component
reacts most to changes in the explanatory variables.
Thus, besides the usual parameter estimates, the
tobit procedure provides these elasticities that serve
as a measure of the impact of changes in an
independent variable on agricultural lending, not just
for current agricultural lenders, but for those that
would quit or enter agricultural lending as well.
Variable Description
The Regressand
The model regressand, Y’, was defined as
the ratio of outstanding nonreal estate agricultural
loans to total bank assets for each commercial bank.
Banks have different investment options, including
agricultural lending. Using total assets as the
denominator shows the relative importance of
agricultural loans in the bank’s investment program
by recognizing the nonloan investment options
available to a bank (e.g., government securities) that
compete with agricultural loans for investable funds.
This ratio increases/decreases ‘as more funds are
moved in/out of agriculture relative to other
investment opportunities. Farm real estate loans
were excluded from the study because commercial
banks, historically, have not offered significant
amounts of this category of loans.
The Regressors
Thirteen model regressors (table 1) were
chosen to reflect the supply and demand factors
affecting Y’, These regressors included five bank
variables, six agricultural variables and two general
variables. The five bank variables included in the
model, designed to capture factors affecting a
bank’s allocation of investable funds among
competing investment opportunities, are: the bank’s
deposit composition, the level of competition faced
by the bank, its organizational structure (specifically
its association with a multi-bank holding company),
location, and equity base. The six agricultural
variables included in the model are: farm
profitability, farm risk, value of farmland and
buildings, size of farming community, ownership of
farmland, and the level of farm mechanization.
These variables affect the degree to which
agriculture attracts investable funds from
commercial banks. The variables population and oil
production were also included in the study because
they are expected to affect the demand and
availability of commercial banks’ investable finds.
Each variable is discussed below.
Deposit M-ucture
A ratio of a bank’s time and savings
deposits to total deposits (DEPOSIT) was used to
represent the proportion of total deposits that are
sensitive to interest rate changes. It can be argued
that there is a positive relationship between
DEPOSIT and loans in general because time and
savings deposits enhance the stability of Ioanable
funds. Therefore, banks need less liquidity and
can invest more money in loans. h can also be
argued that there is a negative relationship.
Deposits are more interest rate sensitive and banks
may choose to increase investments in interest rate
sensitive assets and to decrease investments in
loans, Banks may choose to invest in more
investment securities like U.S. treasury securities
because their interest rate movement more closely
matches the interest rate movements on deposits,
thus, reducing interest rate risk. This may
especially be true in the post-deregulation era that is
characterized by volatile interest rates. Banks could
use adjustable interest rates on loans to make them
more sensitive to interest rate movements.
However, repricing a loan can result in additional
transaction costs to the bank and transferring risk to
a borrower may increase the likelihood of a loan
default. It is not clear which effect overshadows the
other. Thus, the sign on the estimated coefficient is
indeterminate a priori.
Competition
The competition faced by an individual
bank in a certain community or sector (e.g.,
agriculture) should affect its investment decisions.
This is particularly true if there are specialized
lenders. The major competitor of commercial banks116 Be!ubiza and Leatham: Factors Affecting Commercial Bank Lending to Agriculture

















ratio of a bank’s time and savings deposits to total deposits.
an index that measures the amount of competition a bank faces in
its market area for agricultural loans.
binary variable: 1 If a bank belongs to a multl-bank holding
company.
binary variable: 1 If a bank is located in a metropohtan stahstical
area
ratio of a bank’s total equity to M total assets.
ratio of net cash income from farm sales to total farm assets in
each county.
ratio of the coefficient of variation of farm income to the
coefficient of vanatlon of total income m each county.
value of land and bulldmgs ($1,000/acre, average) m each county.
ratio of farm Income to total income In each county
ratio of the number of farmers operating their own land to the total
number of farmers In each county.
eshmated market value of all machmery and equipment m the
county ($ mlUmr).
Population m each county (1,000’s)
amount of 011produced m each county m 1987 (barrels).
in the nonreal estate farm loan market is Production
Credit Associations (PCAS). A commercial bank is
likely to allocate less money to agriculture relative
to its total assets in areas where PCAS and other
competing commercial banks are very active. The
number of alternative credit sources in the
community has previously been used as a proxy for
competition (Barkley et al,), However, this does not
consider the size of the competitors. In this study,
the proxy for bank competition was based on the
volume of assets of its competitors in its market. A
bank’s market area was delineated by county
boundaries, Although this might not be true in all
cases, it has been found a reasonable assumption
under conditions where the study does not focus on
local market characteristics and the flow of funds
(Barry and Pepper; Gilbert). A competition index
was computed that consisted of PCA assets and
total assets of the commercial banks operating in the
same county, The proxy for competition faced by
a bank was computed as
compe~ition indexi = 1 - bank assets , (7)
total assets
where the competition index (COMPETITION) is a
measure of the amount of competition faced by the
jth bank in its market area, with O denoting laok of
competition and I denoting maximum competition;
bank assets refer to the total assets of the jth bank;
and total assets refer to all the combined assets of
PCAS and commercial banks operating in the
county.
Multi-Bank Holding Company (MBHC) Affiliation
Barry and Pepper contend that bank
holding company affiliation in general provides
banks with greater lending capacity, more
competitive behavior, stronger risk bearing, more
flexible funds acquisition, and deeper service
capacity. Thus, MBHC affiliation should contribute
positively to the availability of credit services
offered by smaller banks to agriculture. Following
this reasoning, a positive relationship would be
expected between MBHC affiliation and the
agricultural loan to asset ratio, reflecting the
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finds, to meet large loan requests, to have more
specialized personnel, and to provide credit-related
services. However, MBHC affiliates might also
have more diverse clients and investment
opportunities that might compete for their Ioanable
funds resulting in reduced agricultural lending
relative to total assets. A dummy variable was
defined, with a 1 for multi-bank holding company
affiliation and O otherwise. It is not possible, a
priori, to determine the sign of the estimated
coefficient.
Urban
Urban banks (URBAN), defined as those
banks located in a standard metropolitan statistical
area, have more diverse clients and thus have more
flexibility in moving in and out of agriculture.
Moreover, rural banks are more likely to lend more
money to agriculture relative to their assets than
urban banks because rural banks are more
dependent on the agricultural economy. Thus, a
negative estimated coefficient would be expected for
urban banks.
Farm Profitability
A firm that is achieving a high rate of
return on its assets can increase the return to equity
by increasing its leverage, as long as the rate of
return on assets exceeds the rate of interest paid on
farm debt (Collins). Thus, farmers in a county with
profitable farming operations would demand more
agricultural loans. Similarly, banks in such a
county would be willing to commit a higher
proportion of their asset portfolio to agricultural
loans because of the reduced likelihood of loan
defaults by the farm borrowers. This variable,
which was defined as the ratio of net cash income
from farm sales to total farm assets in each county
(PROFIT), is expected to have a positive
coefficient.
Farm Risk
The ratio of the coefficient of variation of
farm income to the coefficient of variation of total
income in each county (RISK) was used as a
measure of farm risk. It is expected that counties
with higher farm risk would attract less agricultural
lending from commercial banks. Thus, the
estimated coefficient should be negative.
Equity
Value of Farmland and Buildings
An important function of bank capital is to
reduce risk, Koch discusses three ways in which
this is achieved. First, it provides a cushion for
firms to absorb losses and remain solvent. Second,
it provides ready access to financial markets and
thus guards against liquidity problems caused by
deposit outflows. Third, it constrains growth and
limits risk taking. A well-capitalized institution is
in a better position to take on risk by investing
more in loans and less in safe assets like
government securities. Its large equity base would
cushion the institution against large loan losses.
However, the decision makers of less capitalized
institutions may choose a similar investment
strategy to increase expected profits, although at a
greater risk. It is consistent with this risk/return
preference for them to invest in more risky assets
such as loans because of their higher expected
returns. Thus, the estimated coefficient of the equity
variable, which was defined as the ratio of the
bank’s total equity to its total assets (EQUITY), is
indeterminate.
A lender can reduce the likelihood of loan
losses by requiring that land be used as collateral on
nonreal estate loans. A farm located in an area with
high farmland and property values will likely have
a higher collateral value. Higher collateral values
support higher levels of debt. The property value
was standardized across communities by dividing
the total value of farmland and farm buildings in a
county by the total acres of farmland (LAND).
An area with high farm property values,
however, may also be in an area that offers greater
nonagricultural business opportunities. In fact,
such areas will likely be located near commercial
and industrial centers. These commercial and
industrial businesses (and consumers in the
communities) will compete for bank loans. Thus,
agricultural loan portfolios of commercial banks in
these areas may be smaller. Therefore, the sign of
the estimated coefficient is indeterminate, a priori.118 Be/ul)/za and Lea[ham Factors A//iec//ng Commercial B&k Lending 10Agrudture
Size qf Farming Community
Banks located in predominantly agricultural
communities will likely obtain a large percentage of
their deposits from farm firms. To cultivate a
strong bank-borrower relationship, these banks are
likely to lend a greater proportion of their investable
funds to the local farming community. Moreover,
there is a feedback effect, by which a thriving local
community will increase the deposits, providing
more Ioanable funds for the bank. However,
specializing in agriculture can lead to financial
difficulties for the bank in case of an economic
downturn in the local economy. The ratio of farm
income to total income in each county (INCOME),
which was used as a proxy for the size of the
farming community, is expected to have a positive
estimated coefficient.
Ownership of Farmland
It is likely that owner-operators would be
interested in developing and maintaining a more
long term relationship with their Icndcrs than tenant
farmers. Thus, in general, lending to an owner-
operator would be less risky than lending to a tenant
farmer because owner-operators would likely have
a longer farming history and loan collateral on land.
In fact, several credit scoring studies have found
land ownership to be an important factor in
discriminating between potentially good agricultural
loans and bad loans (Dunn and Frey; Luiburrow,
Barry and Dixon; Reinsel). However, there are
other important credit factors such as management
ability, repayment ability, and borrower integrity,
factors that are not unique to owner operators.
Moreover, tenant farmers may not have as much
equity capital as owner-operators and may require
more nonreal estate financing. The ownership of
farmland variable, defined as the ratio of the
number of farmers operating their own land to the
total number of farmers in each county (OWNER),
is expected to have a positive estimated coefficient.
Level of Farm Mechanization
Counties with more mechanized operations
are assumed to require more debt capital to finance
equipment and operating expenses. Thus, this
variable, defined as the estimated market value
of all machinery and equipment in the county
(MACHINE), is expected to have a positive
estimated coefficient.
Population
Population was used as a proxy for
consumer loan demand in each county. Nonfarm
population is expected to provide deposits to
commercial banks, thus, providing banks with
additional loanable funds. However, the nonfarm
population will also compete with farmers for these
loanable funds. Thus, the expected sign of the
estimated coefficient is indeterminate a priori.
Oil Production
An economy strengthened by increased oil
revenue benefits agriculture as a whole, much as an
economy weakened by a loss of oil revenue hurts
agriculture. Besides providing loanable fi.rnds, oil
revenues also affect the purchasing power of those
who depend on agriculture for food and fiber.
However, this model was not designed to capture
these interrelationships. It is easy to predict the
effect of an oil boom or burst on the general
economy of a given state, but it is more difficult to
assess its impact on a local farming community.
Oil production will stimulate the local economy
directly from employment and oil producing
business activities, and indirectly from oil profits
retained in the community. The increase in
economic activity may lead to an increase in local
deposits, thus increasing banks’ loanable funds.
However, the increase in economic activity will
Iikcly increase loan demand for working capital,
expansion of nonagricultural businesses, and
consumer loans that compete with agricultural loans.
The estimated coefficient is, therefore, indeterminate
a priori.
Data Sources
Data on bank variables were obtained from
the FDIC call reports on condition and income, and
agriculture data came from the Census of
Agriculture (USDA, 1978 and 1987). Population
and per capita income figures came from the Local
Area Personal Income’ publications of the U.S.
Department of Commerce, and oil production
figures came from the Railroad Commission of
Texas. Loan information for each PCA wasJ, Agr. and Applied Econ,, July, 1995 119
obtained directly from personnel at the Farm Credit
Bank of Texas. It was estimated that loans were 80
percent of total PCA assets. Total PCA assets
were apportioned among counties by assigning
weights to assets based on the value of farm output
per county relative to the total value of farm output
in the PCA area.
Results
Summary Statistics
Rural banks invested an average of I I
percent of their assets in nonreal estate agricultural
loans (agricultural loan portfolio) in 1978 (table 2).
However, this percentage dropped to 7.6 percent for
rural independent banks and 6.6 percent for MBHC
affiliates in 1987. Urban banks have experienced
similar, but less dramatic, decreases as well. Part of
this drop may be traced to deregulation, particularly
to the high levels of interest rate sensitive deposits
that have characterized the post deregulation era,
However, there have also been some important
changes in the agricultural and banking sector over
this period.
Rural independent banks held fewer time
and savings deposits to total deposits (55 percent )
in 1978, than rural MBHC affiliates (58 percent)
(table 2). These ratios rose to 83 percent and 84
percent respectively, in 1987. Urban banks held 57
percent of their deposits in time and savings
deposits in 1978, and 82 percent in 1987. This
important increase in interest sensitive deposits
likely increased the banks’ cost of funds and its
volatility, which in turn influenced the asset
allocation decisions made by each bank.
Average bank equity ratios in 1978 ranged
from a low of 7.3 percent (Urban MBHC affiliates)
to a high of 8.9 percent (Rural Independent) (table
2). After deregulation, equity ratios decreased by
1.9, 1.2, and 0.4 percentage points for urban and
rural MBHC affiliates, and urban independents,
respectively. Capital increased by 0.4 percentage
points for rural independent banks.
A summary of bank competition as, defined
in equation (7), is presented in table 3 with well
over half the banks in the sample facing a high
level of competition in their market, i.e., had a
competition index of 75 percent or more. Although
the level of competition faced by Texas banks did
not change much since deregulation, individual
banks may have experienced a change in
competition.
The average county PROFIT was 2.3
percent in 1987 (table 4).3 Data for net cash return
from farm sales were not available for computing
PROFIT for 1978. The county average RISK
increased from 66.4 percent before deregulation to
67.5 percent after deregulation, LAND from $464
per acre to $706 per acre, INCOME from 9.3
percent to 9.9 percent, OWNERS from 51.9 percent
to 56.6 percent, MACHINE from $17.7 million to
$22.5 million, and POPULATION from 53,141
people to 66,054 people. OIL decreased from 4.1
million barrels to 2.9 million barrels. As expected,
there were many differences between counties as
measured by the standard deviation.
Estimated Structural Coefficients
The estimated tobit coefficients are
presented in table 5. Columns two and three show
the coefficients and their asymptotic t-ratios.
Except MACHINE, all the estimated coefficients
were statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Column four shows the change in probability of
making agricultural loans due to a unit change in
each independent variable. Columns five and six
show the two components of a total change in E/_Y],
given a change in each independent variable.
Column five represents the change in E[Y] for those
banks that are already making agricultural loans,
weighted by the probability of making agricultural
loans. Column six represents the change in
probability of making agricultural loans, weighted
by the conditional expected value of making
agricultural loans E@]. F(z) denotes the
cumulative standard normal distribution function.
The estimated equation was statistically significant.4
Table 6 contains tobit elasticities computed with
equations (4), (5), and (6). The elasticities of
agricultural Iending from banks already making
agricultural loans were only slightly higher than for
those banks that would begin or stop making
agricultural loans.120 Muhizo and Lea[ham: Factors Affecting Commercial Bank Lending 10Agrmd(ure
Table 2 Descriptive Stausticsfor Banks hIcludcd in tlw Study
Before Dcmgulatioo ( 1978) Aflcr Oercgulalion ( 1987)
[dependent MBIIC. Aftillates’ Independent MBNC - A~llates’
Standard Standard Standard Stmdard
Var!able Location Mean Devmtton Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Sample
Banks (No )’ Rund 496 N/AC 39 N/A 414 NIA 133 NIA
~Jtb,III 384 NIA I34 NIA 218 NIA 288 NIA
[Y’]’ Rural 0,112 0 I(J8 0112 0.102 0076 0,089 0,066 0.089
Urban 0036 0,060 0.01I 0,030 0,020 0031 0.009 0,022
DEPOSIT Rural 0549 0132 0.582 0091 0832 0,099 0,84tl 0083
Urbau 0573 0101 0,569 0,065 0816 0,06 I 0,820 0.062
EQUI 1Y“ Rural 0.089 0.024 0088 0,022 0.093 0041 0,076 0025
Urban 0,080 0019 0073 0015 0,076 0030 0,054 0,030
‘ Banks O1atarc aftllirhl with multi-bank holding companIes(MBIIC)
b I here arc 1,053 bnoksiricludcd in this study,
‘ No! applicable.
‘ Ratio of outstandingnonreal estateagricultural loansto total bank assets
‘ Complete definitions are presentedin table 1,
Table 3. Frequency Distribution of Competition Faced by Sample Banks, 1978 and 1987
Frequency (Number of Banks)





`A Odenotes nocompet]tion andldenotes maximum competition, See equation(7)
for details on the computation of the competition index,
Deposit Structure
The estimated negative coefficient implies
that some decrease in agricultural loan portfolios
since deregulation can be explained by the increase
in interest sensitive deposits held by banks (table 2).
A I percent increase in DEPOSIT results in a 0.85
percent decline in agricultural loan portfolios (table
6). Approximately 0,42 percentage points of the
0.85 percent decline in agricultural loan portfolios
is from banks that stop lending to agriculture.
Competition
A 1 percent increase in COMPETITION
results in a 0.37 percent decrease in the proportion
of agricultural loans in banks’ asset portfolios, with
about half coming from banks that would stop
making agricultural loans (table 6). Bank
competition has not changed much since
deregulation (table 3), thus, COMPETITION does
not explain the decrease in agricultural loan
portfolios. In rural areas, much of the competitionJ, Agr. and Applied Econ , July, /995
Table 4. County Summary Statistics for the Non Bank Variables Used m the Toblt Model, 1978 and 1987,
(Number of Counties= 254~
1978 1987
Standard Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
PROFIT b b . . . . . . 0.023 0.030
RfSK 0,664 0.284 0675 0194
LAND 0.464 0262 0706 0.478
INCOME 0093 0.105 0.099 0133
OWNER 0519 0.137 0.566 0.126
MACHINE 17.678 15.237 22.452 15.665
POPULATION 53.141 191.280 66.054 239.050
OIL 4.099 10.513 2.854 6.641
‘ Varrable name detlnitions arepresented in table 1. Dollar values arem nominal terms.
h Nol Available





DEPOSIT o.0648~ -2.61 -0.3646 -0,0229 -0,0222
COMPETITION -0,0286d -243 -0.1641 -0.0103 -0,0)00
MBHC -0.0112” -2.64 -0.0401 -0.0025 -00024
URBAN -o.oz!9d -4.26 -0.1426 -0.009 -0.0087
EQUITY -0. 1496d -2.56 -0.8261 -0.05 I9 -0,0503
PROFIT 0.S163~ 4.81 2,9687 0.1865 0.1808
Rf.w -0.0287’ -2.21 -0,1670 -0.0105 -0.0102
LAND -0.0198’ -2.85 -0.0898 -0,0056 -0.0055
INCOME 0.2391’ 7.77 1.3974 0.0878 0.0851
OWNER -0.1038d -4.14 -0.6138 -0.0386 -00374
MACHINE o,~765 I.74 1.6536 0.1039 01007
POPULATION -0.0146d -3,67 -0.0850 -00053 -0.0052
OIL -o.oo13d -3.86 -0.0076 -0.0005 -0.0005
CONSTANT o.~ 163d 7.08 ],2577 0.0790 0.0766
‘ Chmgektie probabillV ofmaking agriculwral loans duetoachange inthecowesponding independent
variable.
b Change LnEfY'forthose bamksalready making agricultural loans, weighted bytheprobability of making
agricultural loans.
C Change intheprobabili~ ofmaking agricultural ioans, weighted bytheconditional expected value of
making agricultural loans E[Y ].
d Significant atthe5 percent level.
Note: The standard error around the Tobit index is 0.0580. The predicted probability that Y> O,at the measr
of X, is 0.7191, and Theil’s goodness-of-fit stmstic is 0.3762.122 Be!uhiza and Leatham: Fac[or.s Affecting Commercial Bank Lending [o Agriculture





















































aTheelmtlclty ofuncondlllonal agricultural lendlng (cquatlon (4)). Note that ~E[~ - qE[l’”] + qfi.
bThe clastlclty of agricultural lendlng from banks malang agricultural loans (equation (5)).
‘ The clastlclty of agncukural lemhng from banks that begin or qwt maktng agricultural loans (equation (6)).
faced by commercial banks comes from PCAS.
Thus, the future of PCAS, and the Farm Credit
System as a whole, will have an impact on the
extent to which rural banks participate in
agricultural lending. Reduced PCA activity would
lead to increased commercial bank participation in
agricultural lending, ceteris paribus. Conversely,
increased PCA activity would lead to less
commercial bank participation in agricultural
lending.
Multi-Bank Holding Company Afjlia~ion
Results showed that the coefficient for
MBHC was negative and statistically significant
(table 5). Holding everything else constant,
agricultural loan ratios for MBHCS would be 1.I
percent lower than independent banks. This
corresponds to $1.1 million of agricultural loans for
a bank with $100 million in assets. MBHC
affiliates increased from 16.5 percent of the total
number of commercial banks in Texas before
deregulation to 40 percent afler deregulation (table
2). Thus, part of the decrease in agricultural loan
ratios over this period can be attributed to the
increase in MBHC affiliates afier deregulation.
Moreover, the recent proposals by the Treasury
Department to revise banking laws may decrease
agricultural loan portfolios further if they encourage
an increase of MBHCS.
Urban
Itwas estimated that a rural bank with
$100 million dollars in assets was lending an
average of $2.3 million more to agriculture than a
similar urban bank (table 5). A comparison of the
estimated coefficients for MBHC affiliation and
location reveals that location plays a bigger role
than MBHC affiliation in determining the level of
the agricultural loan portfolio.
Equity
The negative equity coefficient suggests
that less capitalized banks had more agricultural
loans relative to their assets than more capitalized
banks (table 5). As explained above, less
capitalized banks may have assumed more risk by
investing proportionately more of their assets in
loans that have higher expected return and a higher
risk, If successful, this strategy would result inJ. Agr. and Applied Econ., July, 199S
greater profits relative to the capital committed.
However, the negative relationship could be a
reflection of the poor performance of the
agricultural sector in the early 1980’s. Banks
making agricultural loans could have incurred heavy
loan losses eroding the loan loss reserves of these
institutions.
Farm Profitability
As expected, results show that
communities with more profitable farming
operations attract more agricultural loans than
communities with less profitable farming operations
(table 5). Thus, part of the observed decline in
agricultural loan portfolios at Texas commercial
banks since deregulation was a reflection of the
declining performance of the agricultural sector in
Texas in the 1980’s relative to the 1970s. A I
percent decrease in PROFIT results in a 0.14
percent decrease m agricultural loan portfolios
(table 6).
Farm Rikk
In counties where farm income is relatively
more volatile than nonfarm income, less money is
lent to agriculture compared to other investment
opportunities (table 5). A 1 percent increase in
RISK results in a 0.30 percent decrease in
agricultural loan portfolios (table 6), Thus, part of
the observed decline in the agricultural loan
portfolios at commercial banks since deregulation
was a result of the increased risk in production
agriculture (table 4).
Value of Farm Land and Buildings
Results show that a 1 percent increase in
LAND decreases agricultural loan portfolios by 0,28
percent (table 6). A possible explanation for this
unexpected result is the high valued property’s
proximity to urban centers, where nonagricultural
activities are likely to compete more favorably for
bank investments.
Size of Farming Community
The positive estimated coefficient of the
proxy for the importance of agriculture in a county
is expected because a bank located in a
predominantly farming community depends on
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agriculture for borrowers and on farm related
income for its deposits (table 5). However,
INCOME did not increase much atler deregulation,
offering little explanation for the decline in bank
agricultural loan portfolios (table 4).
Ownership of Farm Land
The negative estimated coefficient suggests
that owner-operators borrow less nonreal estate debt
from banks than tenant farmers (table 5), contrary to
the previously stated hypothesis that land ownership
corresponds to high agricultural loan ratios. A
possible explanation is that tenant farmers on the
average have less equity capital, thus requiring
greater financing of operating expenses and
machinery. It is also possible that the owner-
operators that obtain their land loans from the
Federal Land Bank may also obtain nonreal estate
loans from PCAS. This result may also be data
specific. Nonreal estate debt is reported as a real
estate debt in the FDIC call reports when land is
used as collateral. Thus, nonreal estate debt may be
under-reported for owner-operators.
Level of Farm Mechanization
The estimated coefficient of farm
machinery was not statistically significant, although
it had the expected positive sign (table 5),
suggesting little correlation between the level of
agricultural loan portfolios at commercial banks, and
the value of farm machinery in the respective
communities.
Population
The more populated counties attracted
money away from agriculture, with a 1 percent
increase in POPULATION resulting in a 0.10
percent decrease in agricultural loan portfolios (table
6).
Oil Production
The results suggest that agriculture was not
a major beneficiary from “petro-dollars” in oil
producing counties. A 1 percent decrease in OIL
results in a 0.06 percent decrease in agricultural
loan portfolios (table 6).124 Be(uhiza and Leatham: Factor.r Affecting Commercial Bank Lending (o Agriculture
Summary and Conclusions
A tobit econometric procedure was used to
examine the effect of selected demand and supply
factors on the proportion of agricultural loans in
commercial bank asset portfolios. In particular, the
impact of increased commercial bank reliance on
interest sensitive deposits after deregulation on
funds that banks allocate to agriculture relative to
other investment opportunities was examined. Also,
independent banks were compared to multi-bank
holding company affiliates to determine the impact
of bank organization on the share of agricultural
loans in bank asset portfolios.
Results show that as commercial bank
deposits become more sensitive to market rates,
the proportion of agricultural loans relative to
commercial bank assets decline. A 1 percent
increase in the ratio of time and savings deposits to
total deposits was associated with 0.85 percent
decline in the ratio of agricultural loans to total
assets, with almost half of this decline coming from
banks that would stop making agricultural loans.
Also, banks affiliated with multi-bank holding
companies lend less money to agriculture relative to
their assets than do nonmulti-bank holding company
affiliates. Thus, as multi-bank holding company
affiliates continue to increase (e.g., through
acquisitions of failed institutions by existing banking
organizations or through voluntary mergers), there
will be a reduction in agricultural loans provided
relative to the volume of assets held by commercial
banks, which could mean an absolute reduction in
the total amount of loans available to the
agricultural sector.
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Endnotes
1, For some theoretical discussion see J. Tobin, T, Amemiya, and J. Heckman. For some applications,
see J. Heckman, and J.G. Gragg. For a more recent application in the agricultural economics literature,
see O. Capps Jr. and John M. Love.
2. Another common example of a limited dependent variable relates to the wages of married women since
wages are recorded only for women who are in the labor force. Wages of women whose “reservation wage”
exceeds their market wage and who, therefore, stay at home are recorded as zero. No distinction is made
between women whose reservation wage barely exceeds their market wage and those whose reservation
wage is much higher than their market wage. (J. Kmenta, p. 561).126 Betubiza and Leatham: Facvors Affecting Commercial Bank Lending to Agriculture
3. The Agricultural Census Bureau derives the cash return from agricultural sales for the farm unit by
subtracting operating expenditures from the gross market value of agricultural products sold. Depreciation
and the change in inventory values are excluded from expenditures. Gross sales include sales by the
operator andtheshare ofsales received bypafiners, landlords, and contractors, This ratio does not include
capital gains. Farm assets were defined as the sum of the market value of land and buildings, and the
market value of machinery and equipment.
4. A test using the chi-square distribution replaces the usual F test to test the significance of all the
coefficients in the tobit model when maximum likelihood is used. First, the likelihood function is evaluated
when all parameters other than the constant are set to zero (LO). Next, the likelihood function at its
maximum (L~,X) is evaluated. The likelihood ratio test is constructed as -2(1 og LO- log L~,X)-Xz,p where
p is the number of regressors in the statistical model,